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Abstract
This paper investigates how monetary policy should react to oil shocks in a micro-
founded model with staggered price-setting and oil as a non-produced input in the pro-
duction function. We extend Benigno and Woodford (2005) to obtain a second order
approximation to the expected utility of the representative household when the steady
state is distorted and the economy is hit by oil price shocks.
The main result is that oil price shocks generate a trade-oﬀ between inﬂation and output
stabilisation when oil has low substitutability in production. Therefore, it becomes optimal
to the monetary authority to stabilise partially the eﬀects of oil shocks on inﬂation and
some inﬂation is desirable. We also ﬁnd, in contrast to Benigno and Woodford (2005), that
this trade-oﬀ remains even when we eliminate the eﬀects of monopolistic distortions from
the steady state.
Our results also shed light on how technological improvements which reduces the de-
pendence on oil, also reduce the impact of oil shocks on the economy. This can explain
why oil shocks have lower impact on inﬂation in the 2000s in contrast to the 1970s. Since
oil has become easier to substitute with other renewable resources, the impact of oil shocks
has been dampened.
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11 Introduction
Oil is an important production factor in economic activity, because every industry uses it to
some extent. Moreover, since oil cannot easily be substituted by other production factors,
economic activity is heavily dependent on its use. Furthermore, the oil price is determined in
a weakly competitive market; there are few large oil producers dominating the world market,
setting its price above a perfect competition level. Also, its price ﬂuctuates considerably due
to the eﬀects of supply and demand shocks in this market1.
The heavy dependence on oil and the high volatility of its price generates a concern among
the policymakers on how to react to oil shocks. Oil shocks have serious eﬀects on the economy
because they raise prices for an important production input and for important consumer goods
(gasoline and heating oil). This causes an increase in inﬂation and subsequently a decrease
in output, generating also a dilemma for policymaking. On one hand, if monetary policy
makers focus exclusively on the recessive eﬀects of oil shocks and try to stabilise output, this
would generate inﬂation. On the other hand, if monetary policy makers focus exclusively on
neutralising the impact of the shock on inﬂation through a contractive monetary policy, some
sluggishness in the response of prices to changes in output would imply large reductions in
output. Therefore, policymakers are confronted with a trade-oﬀ between stabilising inﬂation
and output. But, what exactly should be the optimal stabilisation of inﬂation and output?
Which factors aﬀect this trade-oﬀ? To our knowledge there is not been a formal study on this
topic.
To answer these questions we extend the literature on optimal monetary policy including oil
in the production process in a standard New Keynesian model. In doing so, we extend Benigno
and Woodford (2005) to obtain a second-order approximation to the expected utility of the
representative household when the steady state is distorted and the economy is hit by oil price
shocks. We include oil as a non-produced input as in Blanchard and Gali (2005), but diﬀerently
from those authors we use a constant-elasticity-of-substitution (CES) production function to
capture the low substitutability of oil. Then, a low elasticity of substitution between labour
and oil indicates a high dependence on oil2.
The analysis of optimal monetary policy in microfounded models with staggered price set-
ting using a quadratic welfare approximation was ﬁrst introduced by Rotemberg and Woodford
(1997) and expounded by Woodford (2003) and Benigno and Woodford (2005). This method
allows us to obtain a linear policy rule derived from maximising the quadratic approximation of
the welfare objective subject to the linear constraints that are ﬁrst-order approximations of the
true structural equations. This methodology is called linear-quadratic (LQ). The advantage
of this approach is that it allows us to characterise analytically how changes in the produc-
tion function and in the oil shock process aﬀect the monetary policy problem. Moreover, in
contrast to the Ramsey policy methodology, which also allows a correct calculation of a linear
1For example during the 1970s and through the 1990s most of the oil shocks seemed clearly to be on the
international supply side, either because of attempts to gain more oil revenue or because of supply interruptions,
such as the Iranian Revolution and the ﬁrst Gulf war. In contrast, in the 2000s the high price of oil is more
related to demand growth in the USA, China, India and other countries.
2In contrast, Blanchard and Gali (2005) use a Cobb-Douglas production function, in which the elasticity of
substitution is equal to one.
2approximation of the optimal policy rule, the LQ approach is useful to evaluate not only the
optimal rules, but also to evaluate and rank sub-optimal monetary policy rules.
A property of standard New Keynesian models is that stabilising inﬂation is equivalent
to stabilising output around some desired level, unless some exogenous cost-push shock dis-
turbances are taken into account. Blanchard and Gali (2005) called this feature the ”divine
coincidence”. These authors argue that this special feature comes from the absence of non-
trivial real imperfections, such as real wage rigidities. Similarly, Benigno and Woodford (2004,
2005) show that this trade-oﬀ also arises when the steady state of the model is distorted and
there are government purchases in the model.
We found that, when oil is introduced as a low-substitutable input in a New Keynesian
model, a trade-oﬀ arises between stabilising inﬂation and the gap between output and some
desired level. We call this desired level the “‘eﬃcient level”. In this case, because output at
the eﬃcient level ﬂuctuates less than it does at the natural level, it becomes optimal to the
monetary authority to react partially to oil shocks and therefore, some inﬂation is desirable.
Moreover, in contrast to Benigno and Woodford (2005), this trade-oﬀ remains even when the
eﬀects of the monopolistic distortions are eliminated from the steady state.
This trade-oﬀ is generated because oil shocks aﬀect output and labour diﬀerently, generat-
ing a wedge between the eﬀects on the utility of consumption and the disutility of labour. The
lower the elasticity of substitution in production, the higher this wedge and also the greater the
trade-oﬀ. In contrast, in the case of a Cobb-Douglas production function, there is no such a
trade-oﬀ because this wedge is zero. Then, in the Cobb-Douglas case stabilising output around
the natural level also implies stabilising output around its eﬃcient level.
Also, the substitutability among production factors aﬀects both the weights on the two
stabilisation objectives and the deﬁnition of the welfare-relevant output gap. The lower the
elasticity of substitution, the higher the cost-push shock generated by oil shocks and the lower
the weight on output stabilisation relative to inﬂation stabilisation. Moreover, when the share
of oil in the production function is higher, or the steady-state oil price is higher, the size of
the cost-push shock increases.
Section 2 presents our New Keynesian model with oil prices in the production function.
Section 3 includes a linear quadratic approximation to the policy problem. Section 4 uses
the linear quadratic approximation to the problem to solve for the diﬀerent rules of monetary
policy and make some comparative statics to the parameters related to oil. The last section
concludes.
2 A New Keynesian model with oil prices
The model economy corresponds to the standard New Keynesian Model in the line of Clarida
et.al. (2000). In order to capture oil shocks we follow Blanchard and Gali (2005) by introducing
a non-produced input M, represented in this case by oil. Q will be the real price of oil which
is assumed to be exogenous. This model is similar to the one used by Castillo et.al. (2007),
except that we additionally include taxes on sales of intermediate goods and oil to analyse the
distortions in steady state.
32.1 Households
















where σ represents the coeﬃcient of risk aversion and ν captures the inverse of the elasticity of
labour supply. The optimiser consumer takes decisions subject to a standard budget constraint



















where Wt is the nominal wage, Pt is the price of the consumption good, Bt is the end of period
nominal bond holdings, Rt is the nominal gross interest rate , Γt is the share of the represen-
tative household on total nominal proﬁts, and Tt are net transfers from the government3. The
















t = MRSt (2.4)
Equation (2.3) is the standard Euler equation that determines the optimal path of consump-
tion. At the optimum the representative consumer is indiﬀerent between consuming today or
tomorrow, whereas equation (2.4) describes the optimal labour supply decision. MRSt denotes
for the marginal rate of substitution between labour and consumption. We assume that labour
markets are competitive and also that individuals work in each sector z ∈ [0,1]. Therefore, L






2.2.1 Final Good Producers
There is a continuum of ﬁnal good producers of mass one, indexed by f ∈ [0,1] that operate
in an environment of perfect competition. They use intermediate goods as inputs, indexed by












3In the model we assume that the government owns the oil endowment. Oil is produced in the economy at
zero cost and sold to the ﬁrms at an exogenous price Qt. The government transfers all the revenues generated
by oil to consumers represented by T
q
t = PtQtMt. There are also a proportional tax on sale revenues (τ
y) and
a proportional taxes on oil sales (τ
q). Then, total net transfers are Tt = ((1 + τ
q)QtMt + τ
yYt)Pt
4where ε is the elasticity of substitution between intermediate goods. Then the demand function
























2.2.2 Intermediate Goods Producers












where M is oil which enters as a non-produced input, ψ represents the intratemporal elasticity
of substitution between labour-input and oil and α denotes the share of oil in the production
function. We use this generic production function in order to capture the fact that oil has few
substitutes, in general we assume that ψ is lower than one. The real oil price, Qt, is assumed
to follow an AR(1) process in logs,
logQt = logQ + ρlogQt−1 + εt (2.11)
where Q is the steady state level of oil price. From the cost minimisation problem of the ﬁrm














where MCt (z) represents the real marginal cost, Wt nominal wages and Pt the consumer price
index, and τq is a proportional tax on oil sales. Notice that marginal costs are the same for
all intermediate ﬁrms, since technology has constant returns to scale and factor markets are











5Intermediate producers set prices following a staggered pricing mechanism a la Calvo. Each
ﬁrm faces an exogenous probability of changing prices given by (1 − θ). A ﬁrm that changes











Pt+k is the stochastic discount factor. The function:






is the after-tax nominal proﬁts of the supplier of good z with price Pt(z), when the aggregate
demand and aggregate marginal costs are equal to Y and MC, respectively. τy is the propor-
tional tax on sale revenues, which we assume constant and equal to τy.The optimal price that





















where µ ≡ ε
ε−1/(1 − τy) is the price markup, P∗
t (z) is the optimal price level chosen by the
ﬁrm and Ft+k =
Pt+k
Pt the cumulative level of inﬂation. The optimal price solves equation (2.14)
























Since only a fraction (1 − θ) of ﬁrms changes prices every period and the remaining one
keeps its price ﬁxed, the aggregate price level, the price of the ﬁnal good that minimise the
cost of the ﬁnal goods producers, is given by the following equation:
P1−ε
t = θP1−ε
t−1 + (1 − θ)(P∗
t (z))
1−ε (2.17)
Following Benigno and Woodford (2005), equations (2.14) and (2.17) can be written recursively
introducing the auxiliary variables Nt and Dt (see appendix B for details on the derivation):
θ(Πt)













Nt = µYt (Ct)
−σ MCt + θβEt [(Πt+1)
 Nt+1] (2.20)
Equation (2.18) comes from the aggregation of individual ﬁrms prices. The ratio Nt/Dt repre-
sents the optimal relative price P∗
t (z)/Pt. These three last equations summarise the recursive
representation of the non linear Phillips curve.
2.3 Market Clearing
In equilibrium labour, intermediate and ﬁnal goods markets clear. Since there is neither capital
accumulation nor government sector, the economy-wide resource constraint is given by
Yt = Ct (2.21)




Where the demand for labour comes from the aggregation of individual intermediate producers





























dz is a measure of price dispersion. Since relative prices diﬀer across
ﬁrms due to staggered price setting, input usage will diﬀer as well, implying that is not possible
to use the usual representative ﬁrm assumption. Therefore, the price dispersion factor, ∆t
appears in the aggregate labour demand equation. We can also use (2.17) to derive the law of
motion of ∆t








Note that inﬂation aﬀects welfare of the representative agent through the labour market.
From (2.24) we can see that higher inﬂation increases price dispersion and from (2.23) that
higher price dispersion increases the labour amount necessary to produce certain level of output,
implying more disutility on (2.1).
2.4 Monetary Policy
We abstract from any monetary frictions assuming that the central bank can control directly
the risk-less short-term interest rate Rt.
72.5 The Log Linear Economy
To illustrate the eﬀects of oil in the dynamic equilibrium of the economy, we take a log linear
approximation of equations (2.1), (2.4),(2.11),(2.12),(2.18),(2.19),(2.20) and (2.23) around the
deterministic steady-state. We denote variables in steady state with over bars (i.e. X) and
their log deviations around the steady state with lower case letters (i.e. xt = log(Xt
X )). After,
imposing the goods and labour market clearing conditions to eliminate real wages and labour
from the system, the dynamics of the economy is determined by the following equations,
lt = yt − δ [(σ + v)yt − qt] (2.25)
mct = χ(ν + σ)yt + (1 − χ)qt (2.26)
πt = βEtπt+1 + κmct (2.27)
yt = Etyt+1 −
1
σ
(rt − Etπt+1) (2.28)
qt = ρqt−1 + ξt (2.29)





, δ ≡ ψχ α
1−α, χ ≡ 1−α
1+vψα and κ ≡ 1−θ
θ (1 − θβ) . Q, and
MC represent the steady-state value of oil prices and of the marginal cost, respectively. α
corresponds to the share of oil on marginal costs in steady state, δ and (1 − χ) accounts for
the eﬀects oil prices in labour and marginal costs, respectively; and κ is the elasticity of inﬂation
respect to marginal costs.
Interestingly, the eﬀects of oil prices on marginal costs, equation (2.26), depends crucially
on the share of oil in the production function, α, and on the elasticity of substitution between
oil and labour,ψ. Thus, when α is large, χ is smaller making marginal costs more responsive to
oil prices. Also, when ψ is lower, the impact of oil on marginal costs is larger. It is important
to note that even though the share of oil in the production function, α, can be small, its impact
on marginal cost, α, can be magniﬁed when oil has few substitutes (that is when ψ is low).
Moreover, a permanent increase in oil prices, that is an increase in Q, would make marginal
cost of ﬁrms more sensitive to oil price shocks since it increases α . In the case that α = 0, the
model collapses to a standard close economy New Keynesian model without oil.
If we replace equation (2.26) in (2.27) we obtain the traditional New Keynesian Phillips
curve.
πt = κyyt + κqqt + βEtπt+1 (2.30)
where κy = κχ(v + σ) and κq = κ(1 − χ). We deﬁne the natural rate of output as the level
of output such inﬂation is zero in all periods, this is given by yn
t = −
κq
κyqt. Then, the Phillips
curve can be written in terms of deviations of output from its natural level:
πt = κy (yt − yn
t ) + βEtπt+1
82.6 Distortions in steady state
The details of the steady state of the variables is in appendix A. In steady state we have two
distortions: the ﬁrst one is the monopolistic distortion and the second one comes from the
Oil market. Related to the ﬁrst distortion, because intermediate goods producers set prices
monopolistically, the price they charge is higher than the marginal cost, and the monopolistic








where τ = τq. Let’s denote the steady state distortion caused by monopolistic competition by
Φ = 1 −
1 − τ
ε/(ε − 1)
where Φ measures the monopolistic distortion, when taxes on sales can eliminate this distortion
we have that Φ = 0. In a competitive equilibrium the marginal rate of substitution between
consumption and leisure must equal the marginal product of labour. However, monopolistic
distortions generates a wedge between this two, given by ΦL






= 1 − (1 − α)(1 − Φ)(1 − δ (σ + v))
Note that in this economy since labour is not the only input in the production function,
then ΦL 6= Φ the wedge in the labour market is not the same as the distortion in marginal
costs. Also, eliminating the monopolistic distortion (Φ) doesn’t eliminate this wedge. The
eﬀect of the monopolistic distortion on ΦL can be eliminated with a subsidy (negative tax
rate) such that ΦL = 0.








Since in this economy ﬁrms are price takers for oil, its price can also be distorted from




Q/MC equals to the one from a competitive equilibrium. In general, when
the oil price is to high respect to marginal cost, the policy to eliminate this distortion is to
subsidise the use of oil (τq < 0), since such high price increases the costs of ﬁrms and reduces
output and consumption below the optimal.
3 A Linear-Quadratic Approximate Problem
In this section we present a second order approximation of the welfare function of the repre-
sentative household as function of purely quadratic terms. This representation allows us to
characterise the policy problem using only a linear approximation of the structural equations
of the model and also to rank sub-optimal monetary policy rules.
9Since the model has a distorted steady state, a standard second order Taylor approximation
of the welfare function will include linear terms, which would lead to an inaccurate approx-
imation of the optimal policy in a linear-quadratic approach. We use then the methodology
proposed by Benigno and Woodford (2005), which consists on eliminating the linear terms of
the policy objective using a second order approximation of the aggregate supply.
3.1 Second order Taylor expansion of the model
In this sub-section we present a log-quadratic (Taylor-series) approximation of the fundamental
equations of the model around the steady state, a detailed derivation is provided in Appendix
B. The second-order Taylor-series expansion serves to compute the equilibrium ﬂuctuations





, where kξtk is a
bound on the size of the oil price shock. Up to second order, equations (2.25) to (2.28) are
replaced by the following set of log-quadratic equations:
Labour Market
lt = yt − δ [(v + σ)yt − qt] +
χ

















1−α (1 − χ)χ
2 [(v + σ)yt − qt]


















vt = κmct +
1









where we have deﬁned the auxiliary variables:









2 (1 − θβ)πtzt 3 − v











yt = Etyt+1 −
1
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Table 3.1: Second order Taylor expansion of the equations of the model
Equations (3-i) and (3-ii) are obtained taking a second-order Taylor-series expansion of the
aggregate labour and the real marginal cost equation, after using the labour market equilibrium
to eliminate real wages. b ∆t is the log-deviation of the price dispersion measure ∆t, which is a
second order function of inﬂation (see appendix B for details) and its dynamic is represented
with equation (3-iii).
We replace the equation for the marginal costs (3-ii) in the second order expansion of the
Philips curve and iterate forward. Then, replace recursively the price dispersion terms from
equation (3-iii) to obtain the inﬁnite sum of the Phillips curve only as a function of output,























where cyy, cyq and cqq are deﬁned in the appendix.
3.2 A second-order approximation to utility
A second order Taylor-series approximation to the utility function, expanding around the non-
stochastic steady-state allocation is:









t + uyqytqt + u∆b ∆t
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and b ∆t ≡ log∆t measure deviations of aggregate output and the
price dispersion measure from their steady state levels, respectively. The term ”t.i.p.” collects
terms that are independent of policy (constants and functions of exogenous disturbances) and
hence irrelevant for ranking alternative policies. ΦL is the wedge between the marginal rate of
substitution between consumption and leisure and the marginal product of labour generated
by the monopolistic distortion, deﬁned in the previous section. The coeﬃcients: uyy, uyq and
u∆ are deﬁned in the appendix B.
We use equation (3-iii) to substitute in our welfare approximation the measure of price
dispersion as a function of quadratic terms of inﬂation. Also, we use the second order approx-
imation of the AS (equation 3.1) to solve for the inﬁnite discounted sum of the expected level
of output as function of purely quadratic terms. Then, as in Beningno and Woodford (2005)


























where Ω = Y ucλπ and Tto = ΦL
κy vto, λπ is deﬁned in the appendix. λ measures the relative
weight between a welfare-relevant output gap and inﬂation. y∗
t is the eﬃcient output, the level
of output that maximises our measure of welfare when inﬂation is zero. The values of λ and
y∗




















11Both γ and η are function of the deep parameters of the model and are deﬁned in the












3.3 The linear-quadratic policy problem
The policy objective Uto can be written on terms of inﬂation and the welfare-relevant output
gap deﬁned by xt:
xt ≡ yt − y∗
t
Benigno and Woodford (2005) show that maximisation of Uto is equivalent to minimise the
















Also, because the objective function is purely quadratic, a linear approximation of vto
suﬃces to describe the initial commitments, given by vto = πto.
We are interested in evaluating monetary policy from a timeless perspective: optimising
without regard of possible short run eﬀects and avoiding possible time inconsistency problems.
Then, from a timeless perspective the predetermined value of πto must equal π∗
to, the optimal
value of inﬂation at to consistent with the policy problem. Thus, the policy objective consists
on minimise (3.7) subject to the initial inﬂation rate:
πto = π∗
to (3.8)
and the Phillips curve for any date from to onwards:
πt = κyxt + βEtπt+1 + ut (3.9)
Note that we have expressed (3.9) in terms of the welfare relevant output gap, xt. ut is a
”cost-push” shock, that is proportional to the deviations in the real oil price:
















In this model a ”cost-push” shock arises endogenously since oil generates a trade-oﬀ between
stabilising inﬂation and deviations of output from an eﬃcient level, diﬀerent from the natural
level. In the next section we characterise the conditions under which oil shocks preclude
simultaneous stabilisation of inﬂation and the welfare-relevant output gap.
124 Optimal monetary response to oil shocks from a timeless
perspective.
In this section we use the linear-quadratic policy problem deﬁned in the previous section to
evaluate optimal and sub-optimal monetary policy rules under oil shocks. This policy problem
















where βt−toϕt is the Lagrange multiplier at period t.
The second order conditions for this problem are well deﬁned for λ ≥ 0, which is the case
for plausible parameters of the model4. Then, as Benigno and Woodford (2005) show, since
the loss function is convex, randomisation of monetary policy is welfare reducing and there are
welfare gains when using monetary policy rules.
Under certain circumstances the optimal policy involves complete stabilisation of the inﬂa-
tion rate at zero for every period, that is complete price stability. These conditions are related
to how oil enters in the production function and are summarised in the following proposition:
Proposition 1 When the production function is Cobb-Douglas the eﬃcient level of output is
equivalent to the natural level of output.
In the case of a Cobb-Douglas production function, the elasticity of substitution between
labour and oil is unity (i.e. ψ = 1). In this case η = 0 and the share of oil on the marginal
costs in the eﬃcient level is equal to the share in the distorted steady state, equal to α (that
is α∗ = α = α) Then, the eﬃcient level of output is equal to the natural level of output.
In this special case of the CES production function, ﬂuctuations in output caused by oil
shocks at the eﬃcient level equals the ﬂuctuations in the natural level. Then, stabilisation of
output around the latter also implies stabilisation around the former. This is a special case in
which the ”divine coincidence” appears . Therefore, setting output equal to the eﬃcient level
also implies complete stabilisation of inﬂation at zero.
In this particular case there is not trade-oﬀ between stabilising output and inﬂation. How-
ever, in a more general speciﬁcation of the CES production function this trade-oﬀ appears, as
it is established in the next proposition:
Proposition 2 When oil is diﬃcult to substitute in production the eﬃcient output respond
less to oil shocks than the natural level, which generates a trade-oﬀ.
When oil is diﬃcult to substitute the elasticity of substitution between inputs is lower than
one (that is ψ < 1). In this case η < 0 and the eﬃcient share of oil on marginal costs is lower
than in the steady state (that is α∗ < α), which causes that the eﬃcient output ﬂuctuates less
4More precisely, we are interested on study the model when 0 < ψ ≤ 1 and σ not too high. Since λ is positive
for ψ ≤ 1 and σ < (αψ)
−1, which is a very high value for the threshold since α is lower than one and small.
13than the natural level (that is |y∗
t| < |yn
t |). Then, in this case it is not possible to have both
inﬂation zero and output at the eﬃcient level at all periods.
It is important to mention that we have this trade-oﬀ even in the case when the
eﬀects of monopolistic distortions on welfare are eliminated (that is when ΦL = 0).
This is because oil shocks aﬀects diﬀerently consumption and leisure in the welfare function.
When there is an oil price shock, output (and hence consumption) decreases because of the
eﬀects on marginal costs. Similarly, labour (and hence leisure) also decreases because of lower
aggregate demand. Since the elasticity of substitution is lower than one, labour decreases less
than the decrease in output, generating a wedge between the utility of consumption and the
disutility of labour. The lower the elasticity, the lower the eﬀect on labour and the higher the
relative eﬀect on production, and the higher this wedge. The eﬃcient level of output is the
one that minimises the eﬀects of oil ﬂuctuations on welfare, which is diﬀerent from the natural
level of output.
Figure 4.1 shows the eﬀect on α∗ and α and on y∗ and yn of the elasticity of substitution.
As mentioned in proposition 1, when ψ = 1 then α∗ = α = α. Similarly, as in proposition 2,
when ψ < 1 it increases both α∗ and α, but α∗ is lower than α. Also, for ψ < 1 the eﬃcient
output ﬂuctuates less than the natural level of output an oil price shock of unity.5
Figure 4.1: (a) Steady state and eﬃcient share of oil on marginal costs. (b) Natural and
eﬃcient level of output.
It is also important to analyse how the production function aﬀects λ, the weight between
stabilising the welfare relevant output-gap and inﬂation. The next two propositions summarise
behaviour of λ.
Proposition 3 When the production function is Cobb-Douglas, the relative weight in the loss
function between welfare-relevant output gap and inﬂation stabilisation (λ) becomes
κy
ε (1 − σα)
In the case of a Cobb-Douglas production function the coeﬃcient γ = 1 and λ =
κy
ε (1 − σα).
5As benchmark calibration we use the same values as in Castillo et.al (2007). Those values are: β = 0.99,σ =
1,v = 0.5,ε = 11,Q = (MC),ψ = 0.6,α = 0.01,ρ = 0.94 and σε = 0.14
14This is similar to the coeﬃcient found for many authors for the case of a closed economy6,
which is the ratio of the eﬀect of output on inﬂation in the Phillips curve and the elasticity of
substitution across goods over, but multiplied by the additional term (1 − σα).
The term (1 − σα) captures the eﬀects of oil shocks in inﬂation through costs, which is
independent of the degree of substitution. When the weight of oil in the production function
(α) is higher, the eﬀects of oil shocks in marginal costs and inﬂation are more important. Then,
the more important becomes to stabilise inﬂation over output.
Proposition 4 The lower the elasticity of substitution between oil and labour, the higher the
weight in the loss function between welfare-relevant output gap and inﬂation stabilisation (λ).
When the elasticity of substitution ψ is lower, the eﬀect of output ﬂuctuations on inﬂation
becomes smaller (κy). This implies a higher relative eﬀect on inﬂation respect to output, and
therefore lower λ. This also implies a higher sacriﬁce ratio, since there are necessary relatively
larger changes on the interest rate in order to stabilize inﬂation.
The next graph shows the eﬀects on λ of the elasticity of substitution for three diﬀerent
values of α. λ takes its lowest value when ψ = 1 and decreases exponentially for lower ψ. Also,
higher α reduces λ , which means a higher weight on inﬂation relative to output ﬂuctuations
in the welfare function.
Figure 4.2: Relative weight between output and inﬂation stabilisation (λ).
6See for example Woodford (2003) and Benigno and Woodford (2005).
154.1 Optimal unconstrained response to oil shocks
When we solve for the Lagrangian (4.1), we obtain the following ﬁrst order conditions that
characterise the solution of the optimal path of inﬂation and the welfare-relevant output gap
in terms of the Lagrange multipliers:
Proposition 5 The optimal unconstrained response to oil shocks is given by the following
conditions:





where ϕt is the Lagrange multiplier of the optimisation problem, that has the following law of
motion :
ϕt = τϕϕt−1 − φqt
for φ ≡
τϕ






where τϕ = Z −
q
Z2 − 1
β < 1 and Z =







The proof is in the appendix. From a timeless perspective the initial condition for ϕto−1
depends on the past realisations of the oil prices and it is time-consistent with the policy
problem.
Also, we deﬁne the impulse response of a shock in the oil price in period t (ξt) in a variable
z in t + j as the unexpected change in its transition path. Then the impulse is calculated by:
It (zt+j) = Et [zt+j] − Et−1 [zt+j]




























See appendix B.3 for details on the derivation.
Figure 4.3 shows the optimal unconstrained impulse response functions to an oil price shock
of size one for diﬀerent values of the elasticity of substitution (ψ) for inﬂation, welfare-relevant
output gap, the nominal interest rate and inﬂation. Inﬂation and the nominal interest rate
are in yearly terms. The benchmark case is a value of ψ = 0.6, similar to the one used by
Castillo et.al. (2007). In these graphs we can see that after an oil shock the optimal response
16Figure 4.3: Impulse response to an oil shock under optimal monetary policy.
is an increase of inﬂation and a reduction of the welfare-relevant output gap, and consequently
also of output. The nominal interest rate also increases to partially oﬀset the eﬀects of the oil
shock on inﬂation. Inﬂation after 8 quarters become negative as the optimal unconstrained
plan is associated to price stability. To summarise, the optimal response to an oil shock imply
an eﬀect on impact on inﬂation that dies dies out very rapidly and a more persistent eﬀect on
output.
A reduction in the elasticity of substitution from 0.6 to 0.4 magniﬁes the size of the cost
push shock, and increases α but reduces λ. Then, the impact on all the variables increases
exponentially, being inﬂation initially the more aﬀected variable. However, after 8 quarters
the response is magniﬁed on the welfare relevant output gap. In contrast, when the elasticity
of substitution is unity, since there is no such a trade-oﬀ, both inﬂation and welfare-relevant
output gap are zero in every period. There is also a reduction on output caused by the oil
shock and the increase on the interest rate needed to maintain zero inﬂation.
174.2 Evaluation of suboptimal rules - the non-inertial plan
We can use our linear-quadratic policy problem for ranking alternative sub-optimal policies.
One example of such policies is the optimal non-inertial plan. By a non-inertial policy we mean
on in which the monetary policy rule depends only in the current state of the economy. In this
case, if the policy results in a determinate equilibrium, then the endogenous variables depend
also on the current state.
If the current state of the economy is given by the cost push shock, which has the following
law of motion:
ut = ρut−1 + $ξt
where ξt is the oil price shock and $ is deﬁned in the previous section. A ﬁrst order general
description of the possible equilibrium dynamics can be written in the form 7:
πt = π + fπut (4.4)
xt = x + fxut (4.5)
ϕt = ϕ + fϕut (4.6)
where we need to determine the coeﬃcients: π,x,ϕ,fπ,fx and fϕ. To solve for the optimal
non-inertial plan we need to replace (4.4),(4.5) and (4.6) in the Lagrangian (4.1) and solve
for the coeﬃcients that maximise the objective function. The results are summarised in the
following proposition:
Proposition 6 The optimal non-inertial plan is given by πt = π + fπut and xt = x + fxut,
where








Note that in the optimal non-inertial plan the ratio of inﬂation/output gap is constant and
equal to
λ(1−ρ)
κy . The higher the weight in the loss function for output ﬂuctuations relative to
inﬂation ﬂuctuations, the higher the inﬂation rate. Also, the more persistent the oil shocks,
the lower the weight on inﬂation relative to the welfare-relevant output-gap.
Similar the the optimal case, the impulse response functions for inﬂation and output are
deﬁned by:
Ini
t (πt+j) = fπ$ρjξt
Ini
t (xt+j) = fπ$ρjξt
Figure 4.4 shows the optimal non-inertial plan to an unitary oil price shock. In this case,
the ratio of inﬂation to the welfare-relevant output gap is constant. For the benchmark case
(ψ = 0.6) the response of inﬂation is lower than in the unconstrained optimal plan, but the
7Note that in this sub-section we focus on the simplest case of the non-inertial plan, in which all endogenous
variables depends only the current state of the economy. In contrast, Benigno and Woodford (2005) work
with a diﬀerent non-inertial plan, in which the lagrange multipliers satisfy the ﬁrst order conditions of the
unconstrained problem
18eﬀect on output is higher. Also, the eﬀects on both variables are more persistent than in the
unconstrained plan.
Furthermore, under the optimal non-inertial plan, when ψ decreases from 0.6 to 0.4 the
impact on all the variables increases. This is due to the magnifying eﬀect of ψ on the cost-
push shock. Also, the reduction of ψ diminishes λ, which increases more the eﬀect on output
relatively to inﬂation. As in the unconstrained case, when ψ = 1 the trade-oﬀ disappears. In
that case, inﬂation is zero in every period and output reduces.
Both exercises, the optimal unconstrained plan and the optimal non-inertial plan, show
that to the extent that economies are more dependent on oil, in the sense that oil is diﬃcult to
substitute, the impact of oil shocks on both inﬂation and output is greater. Also, in this case,
monetary policy should react by raising more the nominal interest rate and allowing relatively
more ﬂuctuations on inﬂation than on output.
Figure 4.4: Impulse response to an oil shock under the optimal non-inertial plan.
195 Conclusions
This paper characterises the utility-based loss function for a closed economy in which oil is
used in the production process, there is staggered price setting and monopolistic competition.
As in Benigno and Woodford (2005), our utility based-loss function is a quadratic on inﬂation
and the deviations of output from an eﬃcient level, which is the welfare-relevant output gap.
We found that this eﬃcient level diﬀers from the natural level of output when the elasticity
of substitution between labour and oil is diﬀerent from one. This generates a trade-oﬀ between
stabilising inﬂation and output in the presence of oil shocks. Also, the cost-push shocks involved
in this trade-oﬀ are proportional to oil shocks. The lower this elasticity of substitution, the
higher the size of the cost-push shock. We also ﬁnd, in contrast to Benigno and Woodford
(2005), that this trade-oﬀ remains even when the eﬀects of monopolistic distortions on the
steady state are eliminated.
Furthermore, the relative weight between the welfare-relevant output gap and inﬂation
on the utility-based loss function depends directly to this elasticity of substitution. On the
contrary, the higher the share of oil in the production function, the relative weight is smaller.
These results show that to the extent that economies are more dependent on oil, in the
sense that oil is diﬃcult to substitute in production, the impact of oil shocks on both inﬂation
and output is higher. Also, in this case the central bank should allow less ﬂuctuations on
inﬂation relative to output due to oil shocks.
Moreover, these results shed light on how technological improvements which reduces the
dependence on oil, also reduce the impact of oil shocks on the economy. This could also explain
why oil shocks have lower impact on inﬂation in the 2000s in contrast to the 1970s. Since oil has
become easier to substitute with other renewable resources, the impact of oil shocks has been
dampened. An observation that accords with the theoretical model provided in this paper.
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22A Appendix: The deterministic steady state
The non-stochastic steady state of the endogenous variables for Π = 1 is given by:
Interest rate R = β−1
Marginal costs MC = 1/µ









































α is the share of oil in the marginal costs. Notice that the steady state values of real wages,
output and labour depend on the steady state ratio of oil prices with respect to the marginal
cost. This implies that permanent changes in oil prices would generate changes in the steady
state of this variables. Also, as the standard New-Keynesian models, the marginal cost in
steady state is equal to the inverse of the mark-up
MC = µ−1 =

(ε − 1)(1 − τy)
ε
−1
≡ 1 − Φ
Since monopolistic competition aﬀects the steady state of the model, output in steady state is
below the eﬃcient level. We call to this feature a distorted steady state and Φ accounts eﬀects
of the monopolistic distortions in steady state.













= (1 − α)(1 − Φ)
the ratio of the marginal rate of substitution multiplied by the ratio labour/output is a
proportion (1 − α) of the marginal costs. This expression helps us to obtain the wedge between
















= (1 − α)(1 − Φ)(1 − δ (σ + v))
≡ 1 − ΦL
where 1 − ΦL accounts for the eﬀects of the monopolistic distortions on the wedge between
the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure and the marginal product
of labour.
B Appendix: The second order solution of the model
B.1 The recursive AS equation
We divide the equation for the aggregate price level (2.17) by P1−ε
t and make Pt/Pt−1 = Πt
1 = θ(Πt)







Aggregate inﬂation is function of the optimal price level of ﬁrm z. Also, from equation (2.14)



































Nt and Dt can be expanded as:
Nt = µYtC−σ

























where we have used the deﬁnition for Ft,t+k = Pt+k/Pt.
24The Phillips curve with oil prices is given by the following three equations:
θ(Πt)







Nt = µY 1−σ
t MCt + θβEt (Πt+1)
ε Nt+1 (B-7)
Dt = Y 1−σ
t + θβEt (Πt+1)
ε−1 Dt+1 (B-8)
where we have reordered equation (B-1) and we have used equations (B-2) and (B-3)
evaluated one period forward to replace Nt+1 and Dt+1 in equations (B-4) and (B-5).
B.2 The second order approximation of the system
B.2.1 The MC equation and the labour market equilibrium
The real marginal cost (2.12) and the labour market equations (2.4 and 2.23) have the following
second order expansion:
mct = (1 − α)wt + αqt +
1
2







wt = νlt + σyt (B-10)
lt = yt − ψ (wt − mct) + b ∆t (B-11)
Where wt and b ∆t are, respectively, the log of the deviation of the real wage and the price disper-
sion measure from their respective steady state. Notice that equations (B − 10) and (B − 11)
are not approximations, but exact expressions. Solving equations (B − 10) and (B − 11) for





(ν + σ)yt + νψmct + vb ∆t
i
(B-12)
Plugging the real wage in equation (B − 9) and simplifying:












where χ ≡ (1 − α)/(1 + vψα). This is the equation (3 − ii) in the main text. This expression
is the second order expansion of the real marginal cost as a function of output and the oil
prices. Similarly, we can express labour in equilibrium as a function of of output and oil prices:



















where δ measures the eﬀects of oil shocks on labour.
25B.2.2 The price dispersion measure









Since a proportion 1−θ of intermediate ﬁrms set prices optimally, whereas the other θ set the
price last period, this price dispersion measure can be written as:














Dividing and multiplying by (Pt−1)
−ε the last term of the RHS:


















t (z)/Pt = Nt/Dt and Pt/Pt−1 = Πt, using equation (2.8) in the text and the deﬁnition
for the dispersion measure lagged on period, this can be expressed as








which is a recursive representation of ∆t as a function of ∆t−1 and Πt.
Benigno and Woodford (2005) show that a second order approximation of the price disper-
sion depends solely on second order terms on inﬂation. Then, the second order approximation
of equation (B-15) is:

















βt−to b ∆t = θ
∞ X
t=to



































Dividing by (1 − βθ) and using the deﬁnition of κ :
∞ X
t=to



















The discounted inﬁnite sum of b ∆t is equal to the sum of two terms, on the initial price dispersion
and the discounted inﬁnite sum of π2
t.
26B.2.3 The second order approximation of the Phillips Curve




































































Where we have deﬁned the auxiliary variables at,bt+1,ct and et+1 as:
at ≡ (1 − σ)yt + mct bt+1 ≡ επt+1 + nt+1
ct ≡ (1 − σ)yt et+1 ≡ (ε − 1)πt+1 + dt+1
Subtract equations (B − 19) and (B − 20), and using the fact that X2−Y 2 = (X − Y )(X + Y ),
for any two variables X and Y :
nt − dt = (1 − θβ)(at − ct) +
1
2
(1 − θβ)(at − ct)(at + ct) (B-21)
+θβEt (bt+1 − et+1) +
1
2









Plugging in the values of at, bt+1, ct and et+1 into equation (B − 21), we obtain: (B − 22)
nt − dt = (1 − θβ)mct +
1
2
(1 − θβ)mct (2(1 − σ)yt + mct) (B-22)













Taking forward one period equation (B − 18), we can solve for nt+1 − dt+1:

















replace equation (B − 23) in (B − 22) and make use of the auxiliary variable zt = (nt + dt)/(1 − θβ)
nt − dt = (1 − θβ)mct +
1
2

























27Notice that we use only the linear part of equation (B − 23) when we replace nt+1−dt+1 in the
quadratic terms because we are interested in capture terms only up to second order of accuracy.
Similarly, we make use of the linear part of equation (B − 18) to replace (nt − dt) = θ
1−θπt in
the right hand side of equation (B − 24). Replace equation (B − 24) in (B − 18):
πt = κmct +
1
2































where zt has the following linear expansion:












Deﬁne the following auxiliary variable:












(1 − θβ)πtzt (B-27)
Using the deﬁnition for vt, equation (B − 25) can be expressed as:
vt = κmct +
1
2










which is equation (3 − iv) in the main text.
Moreover, the linear part of equation (B-28) is:





which is the standard New Keynesian Phillips curve, inﬂation depends linearly on the real
marginal costs and expected inﬂation.
Replace the equation for the marginal costs (B-13) in the second order expansion of the
Phillips curve (B-28)











t + 2cyqytqt + cqqq2
t






where the coeﬃcients coeﬃcients of the linear part are given by
κy = κχ(σ + ν)
κq = κ(1 − χ)
28and those of the quadratic part are:
cyy = χ(σ + ν)[2(1 − σ) + χ(σ + ν)] + (1 − ψ)
χ2 (1 − χ)(σ + ν)
2
1 − α
cyq = (1 − χ)[2(1 − σ) + χ(σ + ν)] − (1 − ψ)
χ2 (1 − χ)(σ + ν)
1 − α
cqq = (1 − χ)
2 + (1 − ψ)
χ2 (1 − χ)
1 − α
Equation B-29 is a recursive second order representation of the Phillips curve. However, we
need to express the price dispersion in terms of inﬂation in order to have a the Phillips curve
only as a function of output, inﬂation and the oil shock. Equation B-29 can also be expressed






















































which is equation (3.2) in the main text.
B.3 A second-order approximation to utility




βt−to [u(Ct) − v (Lt)] (B-31)















Similarly, the second term:














Replace the equation for labour in equilibrium in B-33:






t + vyqytqt + v∆b ∆t








vy = 1 − δ (v + σ)






χ2δ (σ + v)
2









We make use on the following relation:
LvL = (1 − Φ)(1 − α)Y uc (B-35)
where Φ = 1 − 1
µ = 1 − 1−τ
ε/(ε−1) is the steady state distortion from monopolistic competition.
Replace the previous relation, equation B-32 and B-34 in B-31, and make use of the clearing
market condition: Ct = Yt









t + uyqytqt + u∆b ∆t








uy = 1 − (1 − Φ)(1 − α)vy = ΦL
uyy = 1 − σ − (1 − Φ)(1 − α)vyy = 1 − σ − (1 − ΦL)vyy/(1 − δ (v + σ))
uyq = −(1 − Φ)(1 − α)vyq = −(1 − ΦL)vyq/(1 − δ (v + σ))
u∆ = −(1 − Φ)(1 − α)v∆ = −(1 − Φ)χ
where we make use of the following change of variable:
ΦL = 1 − (1 − Φ)(1 − α)(1 − δ (v + σ)) (B-37)
where ΦL is the eﬀective eﬀect of the monopolistic distortion in welfare through the of output.
Notice that when we eliminate the monopolistic distortion, i.e. Φ = 0, ΦL is not necessarily
equal to zero.
Replace the present discounted value of the price distortion (B-17) in B-36:

























u∆ = −(1 − Φ)χ
ε
κ
Use equation B-30, the second order approximation of the Phillips curve, to solve for the












































































additionally we have thatΩ = Y uc and Tto = Y uc
ΦL
κy vto
Make use of the following auxiliary variables:
ω1 = (1 − σ)ΦL + χ(σ + v)









then, λy, λπ and y∗
t can be written as a function of ω1, ω2 and ω3
λy = ω1 + (1 − ψ)ω2
λπ =
ε
κy (1 − σψα)






ω1 − (1 − ψ)
χ
1−χω2
ω1 + (1 − ψ)ω2
#
qt
using the deﬁnitions for χ, y∗













(1 − ψ)(1 − α)ω2
(1 − χ)ω1 − (1 − ψ)χω2
















31Note from the deﬁnition for η that when ψ = 1, then η = 0, α∗ = α = α and y∗
t = yn
t . For a
Cobb-Douglas production function the eﬃcient level of output equals the natural level. Also,
when ψ < 1, then η > 0, α∗ < α and |y∗
t| < |yn
t |. For elasticity of substitution between inputs
lower than one the eﬃcient level ﬂuctuates less to oil shocks than the natural level. Also note
that even when ΦL is equal to zero, which summarises the eﬀect of monopolistic distortions on
the wedge between the marginal rate of substitution and the marginal product of labour, η is
still diﬀerent than zero for ψ 6= 1. This indicates that the eﬃcient level of output still diverges
from the natural level even we eliminate the eﬀects of monopolistic distortions.
















κy (1 − σψα)
ε
γ
where we use the auxiliary variable:
γ ≡

ω1 + (1 − ψ)ω2
ω1 + (1 − ψ)ω3

Note that when ψ = 1, then γ = 1 and when ψ < 1, then γ = 1 since ω2 > ω3.
C Appendix: Optimal Monetary Policy
C.1 Optimal response to oil shocks






















where βt−toϕt is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the constraint at time t
The ﬁrst order conditions with respect to πt and yt are respectively
πt = ϕt−1 − ϕt (C-1)
λxt = κyϕt (C-2)




to is the initial value of inﬂation which is consistent with the policy problem in a
”timeless perspective”.
32Replace conditions C-1 and C-2 in the Phillips Curve:
βEtϕt+1 −

(1 + β)λ + κ2
y

ϕt + λϕt−1 = λut (C-3)
this diﬀerence equation has the following solution8 :




where τϕ is the characteristic root, lower than one, of C-3, and it is equal to












/(2β). Since the oil price follows an AR(1) process of the form:
qt = ρqt−1 + ξt
and the mark-up shock is: ut = $qt, then ut follows the following process:
ut = ρut−1 + $ξt (C-5)
Solution to the optimal problem Taking into account C-5, equation C-4 can be expressed
as:






Initial condition Iterate backward equation (C-6) and evaluate it at to−1, this is the timeless




which is a weighted sum of all the past realisations of oil prices.
Equations (C-1), (C-2), (C-6) and (C-7) are the conditions for the optimal unconstrained
plan presented in proposition 3.5. Impulse responses An innovation of ξt to the real oil price
aﬀects the current level and the expected future path of the lagrange multiplier by an amount:





for each j ≥ 0. Given this impulse response for the multiplier. (C-1) and (C-2) can be used to
derive the corresponding impulse responses for inﬂation and output gap:


















which are expressions that appear in the main text.
8See Woodford (2003), pp. 488-490 for details on the derivation.
33C.2 The optimal Non-inertial plan
We want to ﬁnd a solution for the paths of inﬂation and output gap such that the behaviour
of endogenous variables is function only on the current state. That is:
πt = π + fπut (C-8)
xt = x + fxut (C-9)
ϕt = ϕ + fϕut (C-10)
where the coeﬃcients π,y,ϕ,fπ,fx and fϕ are to be determined
Replace (C-8), (C-9) and (C-10) in the Lagrangian and take unconditional expected value:

















(1 − β)π − κyx







+E ((ϕ + fϕuto−1)[π + fπuto]) (C-11)
suppressing the terms that are independent of policy and using the law of motion for ut, this


























fϕ ((1 − βρ)fπ − 1 − κyfx)
+ρσ2
ufϕfπ
the problem becomes to ﬁnd π,y,ϕ,fπ,fx and fϕ such that maximise the previous expression.
Those coeﬃcients are:
π = x = ϕ = 0
fπ =
λ(1 − ρ)








λ(1 − βρ)(1 − ρ) + κ2
y
which is the solution to the optimal non-inertial plan given in proposition 3.6.
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